We study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated .
INTRODUCTION
I N T H I S P A P E R we study duopolistic competition through time under the assumption that the price of a homogeneous product does not adjust instantaneously to the price indicated by its demand function at the given level of output. Thus, at each point in time identical duopolists face a constant price that they know will decline, but not instantaneously, if their joint output exceeds the level of demand at that price. The evolution of price through time is a function of the difference between the current price and the price on the demand function for each level of output. We allow the duopolists to exploit the lag in price adjustment to their advantage. Previous studies of Cournot duopoly with less than instantaneous adjustment in quantities have tended to overlook the strategic possibilities provided by lags (see Waterson (1984) for a review of this literature). We employ a differential game framework to analyze the interaction between the duopolists through time and determine the open-loop and closed-loop (feedback) Nash equilibria of the duopoly game.
Our main objective is the study of the static Cournot equilibrium as an asymptotic limit of competition through time with sticky prices as the speed of adjustment becomes instantaneous. In order to carry out this investigation we incorporate a speed of adjustment term in our formulation of the differential equation governing the evolution of the price. When the speed of adjustment goes to infinity, price converges instantaneously to its value on the demand function for the given level of output. Our main conclusion is that the static ' We would like to thank the members of the workshop at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Jerusalem, Israel, David Kreps, a n d two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.
Cournot equilibrium price is the asymptotic limit, as the speed of adjustment goes to infinity, of the open-loop Nash equilibrium while the stable closed-loop Nash equilibrium price converges to a value below it. This result is interesting because the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect while the closedloop Nash equilibrium is.
A differential game framework was employed explicitly by Simaan and Takayama (1978) to study dynamic duopoly with sticky prices and implicitly by Roos (1925 Roos ( , 1927 . Simaan and Takayama (1978) focus on the role of capacity constraints and assume the speed of adjustment to be unity. We allow for an arbitrary adjustment speed and focus on the limiting case when it is instantaneous. There have been a number of empirical studies supporting the hypotheses that prices are sticky-see Rotemberg (1982) for an overview of this literature. An interpretation of open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria in terms of the commitments required of the players in a differential game are provided by Reinganum and Stokey (1985) . Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Kreps and Spence (1983) provide reviews of recent analyses of dynamic oligopoly models.
Our analysis is conducted under the assumptions that demand is a linear function of price, total cost is a quadratic function of output, and there is no uncertainty. We show that the Nash equilibria of the differential game are symmetric. In the next section we introduce our formulation of the differential game and derive the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium in the subsequent two sections, respectively. In Section 4 we define the "limit game" and derive our basic results regarding the asymptotic properties, as price adjusts instantaneously, of the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria. The last section contains a summary of our analysis.
FORMULATION A N D NOTATIONS
Consider a duopoly in which both firms have the cost function ( 1 . 1 ) ~( u ; ) = cui +$u:
where ui 3 0 is the ith firm's output rate. In static analysis an inverse demand function is given, in its linear version, by
, where for simplicity we will set b equal to one. Under the assumption of "sticky prices," the price does not adjust instantaneously to the level given by the demand function for a given level of output. This adjustment takes time and the rate of change of price is a function of the gap between the current market price and the price indicated by the demand function for the currently produced quantities. Adopting Simaan and Takayama's (1978) 
It is evident from (1.4) that firms face a downward sloping linear inverse demand function but that the decline in price along it, as a firm's level of output increases, is retarded when s is finite. As s + a, the term pui/s vanishes and price adjusts instantaneously along the demand function.
The source of the stickiness in prices can be traced to the inverse demand function implied by (1.2). Integration of (1.2), with p(0) = a and u , + u, = u yields
This inverse demand function is consistent with consumers' utility functions that depend on both current consumption and past consumption of a good, as in Ryder and Heal (1973) . Specifically, Ryder and Heal posit a utility function of the form W ' W ( C ( t ) , Z ( t ) ) , where C ( t ) represents current consumption and Z ( t ) represents exponentially weighted accumulated past consumption. A special case of this utility function is of the form W = C f ( Z ) , from which it follows that the marginal utility of current consumption a
with the right side of (1.5) yields the result that (1.5) is an inverse demand function stemming from the posited utility function. According to ( I S ) , recent consumption of the good has a more depressing effect on its current desirability than earlier consumption does. The demand function (1.5) yields a linear inverse demand function in current consumption as can be seen by integrating its right side by parts, and assuming differentiability of u ( r ) , and letting s + a to get
The linear inverse demand function (1.6) is a special case of (1.5) in which the marginal utility of current consumption is concentrated entirely on present consumption. This relationship between (1.5) and (1.6) through s provides the key to the meaning of sticky prices in our model. For with s finite, the marginal utility of current consumption is not entirely concentrated on consumption at the present instant of time. Thus, with s finite the marginal utility of current consumption does not decline with an increase in present consumption by as much, and therefore price does not have to decline by as much to induce this level of present consumption, as it does when s + co.
The appropriate framework for analyzing the problems posed in (1.2) and (1.3) is as differential games. In analyzing a differential game two major strategy spaces are commonly examined in the literature-the open-loop and the closed-loop (feedback) strategy spaces. The open-loop strategies can be characterized as path strategies. Each player chooses a path of action ui(t) to which he commits himself at the outset of the game. Neither has the option to reconsider this strategy and change it. A Nash equilibrium in such strategies (Definition 2) is a pair of paths (or n-tuple in the case of n players) such that each player's path is the best response to its rival's path. Following Reinganum (1982, pp. 674-675) , we define the closed-loop strategy space as follows.
DEFINITION 3: The closed-loop (feedback) strategy space for player i is the set Si = {ui(t, p)lui(t, p ) is continuous in (t, p); ui(t, p ) 2 0 and
The closed-loop strategies describe decision rules that prescribe an output rate as a function of time and the observed market price. Players in this case do not commit themselves to a particular path at the outset and can respond to different prices they observe.
DEFINITION 4: A closed-loop Nash equilibrium is a pair of closed-loop strategies (u?, u;) E S1 x S2 such that for every possible initial condition (p,, to):
For later reference note that in the static game when the demand function is
given by p = a -( u , + u,) and the cost function is specified by (1.1), the Cournot equilibrium price is and the "competitive" price when both firms behave according to the rule "marginal cost equals price" is
OPEN-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM 1: There is a unique stationary open-loop Nash equilibrium for the above game. The price at this equilibrium is:
and theJirms' strategies are given by PROOF: For every given path u j ( t ) of firm j, firm i faces the problem of maximizing (1.3) subject to (1.2) and given u j ( t ) . A similar problem of course faces player j. An equilibrium in the market is a pair of open-loop strategies that solves the two optimization problems simultaneously. Forming the current value Hamiltonian in the standard way, the necessary conditions for an open-loop equilibrium are 
as ( 4~+ 3 r )~
For r+ co or s + 0 it is straightforward to check that the stationary equilibrium price converges to p* = P*,.
Q. E. D
The intuitive explanation of Proposition 1 is that, if we start at the Cournot equilibrium price, increasing output has little short-run impact on prices, and so given impatience, firms expand production.
The above necessary conditions can be used to find the open-loop equilibrium price trajectory for a game that starts at po Z p*.
PROPOSITION 2: The open-loop Nash equilibrium price trajectory is given by (2.7) p e ( t ) =p*+(po-p*) ekl'
where p* is the stationary equilibrium price given by (2.1), po is the initial price at t = 0, and k , is a negative constant that depends on the parameters of the problem.
PROOF: See Appendix 2.
An immediate corollary from this proposition is that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. The equilibrium price trajectory converges to the stationary equilibrium price, which does not depend on the initial price.2 * For more detailed discussion about existence, stationarity and global asymptotic stability of open-loop equilibria, see Fershtman and Muller (1984, 1986) .
THE SUBGAME PERFECT CLOSED-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM 2: Let
Then ( u T ( p ) , u q ( p ) ) constitutes a symmetric global asymptotically stable closedloop subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the infinite horizon dynamic game under consideration.
PROOF: The proof will be carried out in two steps. First we consider the case in which p , a $ . In this case we have an interior solution. Then we will consider the case po < $. is the value for player i of the game that starts at price p. Note that although in the general case V' is also a function of t and not just of the state variable, it can be shown that if time enters the objective function (1.3) only through the discount term that the value functions do not depend on t (see Kamien and Schwartz (1981, p. 238 
)).
Since the right side of the above equation is concave, the ui that maximizes it is given by Substituting (3.6) into (3.5) yields Expression (3.7) presents a system of two partial differential equations. By solving this system and finding the value functions (~' ( p ) , v 2 ( p ) ) , we can use (3.6) to find the equilibrium strategies. For every p a $ we propose the following quadratic value function: Substituting v i ( p ) and v ; ( p ) into (3.7) yields a condition that must hold for every p. We show in Appendix 3 that only a symmetric equilibrium can be asymptotically stable. Using straightforward algebraic manipulation we can conclude that the symmetric equilibrium K and E are given by and Now substitute v ; (~) into (3.6) to yield that the strategies
(3.11) u T = ( l -s K ) p + ( s E -c )
( i = 1 , 2 ) ,
where K and E as defined by (3.9) and (3.10), respectively, constitute a subgame perfect closed-loop Nash equilibrium for the dynamic game under consideration. However, since (3.9) is a quadratic equation it has two possible solutions for K . These two solutions define two possible equilibrium strategies. In Appendix 3 we prove that only the symmetric solution with the minus sign, i.e., (3.2), defines a globally asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium.
CASE 2: po<p^. In this case the constraint ui 0 is binding and we need to modify the proof. In maximizing the right side of (3.5) for p<p^ no interior solution can be reached and the optimal output policy in this case is u? = O . However, as (1.2) indicates when u, = u 2 = 0 the price goes up. If a <p^, price will go up until it will be equal to a, but since a <p^ no production will take place. If a >p^, price will go up until p 3; and then the equilibrium is the one discussed in Case 1 . In order to establish the subgame perfectness of this equilibrium we need to also define a value function for prices below p^ and then to show that condition (3.5) is satisfied for this value function. When ui = 0 , i = 1,2, the price path p( t ) is given by (3.12) p ( t ) = p o e-"' + a ( 1 -e-"').
Let i ( p ) denote the time that it takes for the price to reach the level p^ from the level p. Now for every p <p^, let us define the value function (3.13) v ' (~) = e-r"P' vi(P^), where vi(p^) is defined by (3.8). The economic explanation of this value function is straightforward. For every p <p^ optimal output is zero and thus profits are zero. The first time the firms deviate from the zero production level is when price reaches p^; the value of a game starting at p^ is already discussed and defined by (3.8). Thus, the value of the game that :tarts at p <p^ is the discounted value of vi(p^). Using (3.12), the condition that t ( p ) must satisfy is p^ = p e-"'+ a ( 1 -e-"') which implies that d i / d p = -l / s ( a -p ) . Differentiating the value function (3.13) with respect to p yields Thus, it is straightforward to verify that the suggested value function satisfies (3.5).
Q. E. D. PROOF: AS is demonstrated in Appendix 3, the equilibrium price path is p ( t ) = p * + ( p o -p * ) eDT where p* is specified by (3.15) and D is a negative constant that depends on the parameters of the problem.
Q. E. D.
COROLLARY 2: AS the price in the market increases, the jirms increase their output rate.
PROOF: The equilibrium strategies are given by (3.1) which are linear functions of price. The coefficient that multiplies p is given by 1 -sK > 0.
Q. E. D.
An immediate corollary of the above discussion is that as r + w the equilibrium price converges to the competitive price as defined in (1.8). This is true since (3.2) and (3.3) imply by 1'Hospital's rule that lim,,, K = 0 and lim,,, E = O which implies that VL = 0, i = 1,2. The equilibrium strategies in this case (see (3.1)) are u* = p -c, i = 1,2. This policy implies that u* + c = p which is identical to the well-known rule MC = MR, when M R is taken to be instantaneous marginal revenue and not long run marginal revenue. The stationary equilibrium price is given in this case by p* = ( 1 / 3 ) ( a + 2 c ) which is exactly the competitive equilibrium price of the static game in which firms set marginal cost equal to price. This result is intuitively appealing. A very high interest rate implies that the importance of the future declines. As r approaches infinity firms stop taking into consideration the future effects of their current actions. Thus, the policy that they follow is marginal cost equals short run marginal revenue which is equal, under the assumption of this model, to price. The resultant equilibrium price in this case is, of course, the competitive price.
THE "LIMIT GAME": T H E D Y N A M I C G A M E WITH INSTANTANEOUS PRICE

ADJUSTMENT
In previous sections we based our dynamic game on the assumption that the speed of adjustment is finite. It is this assumption that makes the game we consider different from a repeated Cournot game in its continuous time version. When s goes to infinity the dynamic structure disappears and the price jumps instantaneously to its level on the demand function for each level of output. Thus, for s + co the game can be viewed as a repeated Cournot game in its continuous time version. In this section we let s -, co and examine the limits of the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria. PROOF: The stationary closed-loop equilibrium price is given by (3.15). Let /3 = lim,,, sK and y = lim,,, sE. Using equation (3.2) yields that /3 = 1 -a> 0. Similarly, from (3.3) we obtain that y = ( c -ap -2cp)/(3 -3p). Note that from (3.2) and (3.3) that lim,.,o sK = P and lim,,, sE = y. Thus, as s + co or r + 0, the equilibrium price approaches Substituting for y and rearranging yields upon recalling that P = 1 -a, and (1.7) and (1.8).
Q. E. D.
From (3.1) it is evident that the limit as s + a or r+O of the closed-loop equilibrium strategies is The intuitive reason for the difference between the open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium price is that in the formulation of the closed-loop strategy each player takes into account the optimal reaction of its rival to a change in the state variable while in the formulation of an open-loop strategy it does not. The stable closedloop equilibrium strategy, in the problem we analyze, is an increasing linear function of the state variable, price. Thus, each firm will decrease its output when price decreases. Let us see what taking the rival's reaction to a decrease in price into account means in terms of a firm's output decision. If a firm ignores this reaction by its rival and simply makes the Cournot assumption that its rival's output will remain at its present level, then it will make its output decision on the basis of the residual demand curve it faces. If, on the other hand, it takes its rival's reaction to a price change into account, it will know that as it expands its output and causes prices to fall, its rival will contract his output. Thus, its movement down its residual demand curve will be offset somewhat by an outward shift of the residual demand curve as its rival contracts his output. This, of course, will cause the-firm to optimally expand its output beyond the optimal level when its rival's reaction to a price change is ignored. As both rivals will take each others' optimal reaction to a change in price into account in the formulation of their optimal closed-loop strategies, the equilibrium output will be greater than in the equilibrium of the open-loop strategies where rivals' reactions to price changes are ignored.
It is not difficult to show that profits are higher at the stationary open-loop equilibrium than at the stationary closed-loop equilibrium. Since the open-loop equilibrium is the case in which each player commits himself to an output path at the outset, and does not condition his output rate on the observed price, it is clear that the players can benefit from such commitments.
REMARK: Besides the stable stationary equilibrium price (4.2), there is another stationary equilibrium price, which is not asymptotically stable. This equilibrium price is higher than the Cournot price. It arises from the larger root in (A.3.10) and is an unstable equilibrium since starting from any initial price Po # P there will not be convergence to P (see (A.3.9)).
The above two theorems imply the following corollary:
COROLLARY 3: The static Cournot equilibrium price is the limit, as price adjusts instantaneously, of the open-loop equilibrium price which is not subgame perfect while the subgame perfect equilibrium converges to an equilibrium price below the static Cournot equilibrium price.
We note that in defining the closed-loop strategy space we restricted ourselves to Markovian decision rules that are continuous in the state variable. Thus, we ruled out discontinuous strategies that allow the use of threats and trigger strategies. It can be shown by standard methods that if discontinuous history dependent strategies are allowed, then a collusive equilibrium can be supported in our model. The stable closed-loop equilibrium that we consider is, however, subgame perfect even in the game with discontinuous history dependent strategies.
S U M M A R Y
We have analyzed a differential game of duopolistic competition through time under the supposition that price does not adjust instantaneously to its level on the demand function for each level of output. Our focus has been on the difference between the stationary state open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria of this game, in the limit, as price adjusts instantaneously. We find that the stationary state open-loop equilibrium price converges to the static Cournot equilibrium price, as price adjusts instantaneously, while the stationary state closed-loop equilibrium price converges to a price below it. An intuitive explanation for this difference is that in the closed-loop strategy, which is subgame perfect, each duopolist knows that the loss in future profits from expansion of current output will be shared by his rival, who will attempt to at least partially offset it by contracting his output. Thus each duopolist will expand his current output beyond the level that he would if he alone bore the full loss in future profits. On the other hand, when the duopolists follow open-loop strategies their ability to shift some of the loss in future profits from expansion of current output on their rival is limited by a commitment to an output path at the outset. This shifting of the loss in future profits on the rival persists when the price adjusts instantaneously for the stationary state closed-loop strategies but vanishes for the stationary state open-loop strategies. 
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S Y M M E T R Y O F T H E O P E N -L O O P EQUILIBRIUM
To show that the open-loop equilibrium must be symmetric we solve for u, in (2.3) and substitute into (2.4), to get Solving this differential equation and employing the transversality condition to evaluate the constant of integration yields Thus, A , ( t ) = A2(t) as they both equal the right side of the above equation. It follows from (2.3) and the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian in u,, that u , ( t ) = u 2 ( t ) .
APPENDIX 2
PROOF O F PROPOSITION 2
A detailed proof is long but standard. A proof will merely be out!ined here. Differentiating the kinematic equation (1.2) with respect to t and substituting in it A, A and u from equations (2.31, (2.4), and (1.2), respectively, yield that the equilibrium price trajectory must satisfy the following second order linear differential equation: A.3.4) this means that r+3s < 0 , which is impossible as r and s are both nonnegative. Thus, an asymmetric closed-loop equilibrium uT # u z cannot be asymptotically stable.
We turn then to the symmetric equilibrium, where K , = K , = K, El = E , = E, and g , = g,. The explicit values of K and E are given by (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. The complete solution of the kinematic equation (1.2), the counterpart of (A.3.8) in the symmetric equilibrium, is (A.3.9) p
( t ) = j i + ( p , , -P ) en'
where p = p* is given by (3.15) and D = s [ 2 ( s K -1 ) -11.
